Abstract
intimidating and distressing. 10 There is a clear risk that the child's emotional and physical wellbeing -her welfare -will be detrimentally affected. Secondly, children are less able to enjoy the rights qua suspect: rights that facilitate effective participation and protect against wrongful conviction. Empirical research from both the USA and England and Wales has shown that amongst juveniles there is a low level of understanding of their 'due process' rights. 11 In England and Wales, Hazel et al reported in 2009 that young people lacked clarity in understanding their rights in the police station, and supervising officers also reported this to be the case. 12 This is especially problematic in terms of the right to legal advice. Young suspects are less likely than adults to be told that they are entitled to legal advice, and are less likely to request that advice. 13 In part, this is because children do not always recognise the importance of receiving legal advice and may misunderstand the role of the duty solicitor, believing -as HC did -that she or he is a 'police lawyer' and therefore not independent.
14 The absence of a lawyer compounds the difficulties children face in police questioning, which is experienced by them as intimidating and confusing, 15 and Hine cites research that suggests that young people 'learn that it is easiest to go along with the adult view than to resist'; 16 a finding supported by Hazel et al. 17 Combined with the pressure of 'societal expectation of youthful obedience to authority', 18 it is apparent that children are more susceptible than adults to making self-incriminatory statements, false confessions, 19 and to admit to behaviour without fully understanding the consequences of doing so. 20
Protections for detained children in English law
In English law, there are three principal ways in which these factors are taken into account during police detention, and which differentiate the rights available to adults and the rights available to children. First, under section 34(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, the child has a right to have the person who is responsible for his welfare to be notified of his arrest, 21 and told why he has been arrested and where he is being held. 22 This right is replicated in PACE Code of Practice C, 23 and goes beyond the rights of all suspects not to be held incommunicado 24 which can be restricted in some circumstances. 25 Secondly, Code C also requires that an appropriate adult be provided to all juveniles to provide advice and assistance, to facilitate communication, and to ensure that the she is being treated properly 19 Press, 1990 ) at p 116 on the susceptibility of juveniles to false confessions. This is also recognised in Code C though there the tone is slightly different (it says that children are also more 'prone in certain circumstances to provide [emphasis added] information that may be unreliable, misleading or selfincriminating'-Code C, paragraph 11C). 20 For example, that doing so might lead to a final warning (as was) and the negative consequences resulting from that. See 21 I am using the male pronoun for simplicity and because the applicant in the case was male. 22 Section 34(9) of the 1933 Act describes this as the child's right, not the right of the parent or guardian. This is in line with Article 40(2)(b) of the UNCRC which requires that a child's parents are ' . . .informed promptly and directly of the charges against him or her and, if appropriate, through his or her parents or legal guardians and to have legal or other appropriate assistance. . .' and also the broader principle in Article 9 which requires that where a child is separated from her parents as a result of detention, imprisonment, exile etc the state party shall on request provide information about whereabouts of the absent member of the family (parent or child) unless the provision of information would be detrimental to the wellbeing of the child. 23 
1933
. 34 As such, prior to the legal challenge brought by HC, 17 year olds were excluded from the special protections afforded to all other children detained in police custody.
3. Recent developments in youth justice: reforming age-based anomalies
That 17 year olds have been excluded from the protections afforded to other children is a result of the alterations to the upper age limit of youth justice, which -as with the lower threshold of criminal liability for children -has shifted over the past 100 years, partly reflecting changing societal constructions of childhood. adults within PACE. 48 The announcement meant that the status quo was maintained and it was this backtracking by the Coalition Government that prompted the legal challenge in HC.
THE FACTS IN HC
The case centred on the arrest and detention of HC, a 17 year-old boy who had never been in 49 Above, text at nn 22 and 24. 50 See HC para [8] . 51 An oyster card is an electronic payment card used on public transport throughout London. 52 The provisions in the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and PACE 1984 (the Act itself, not the Codes) were not the focus of the challenge; rather it was the discretionary powers of the Home Secretary that were the object of concern. The validity of primary legislation cannot, of course, be questioned by a court, but its compatibility with the ECHR could have been considered under ss 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. judicial review and it contravened Article 6 and Article 8 of the ECHR (see below). The basis of the challenge to the Commissioner of Police was two-fold. First, it was argued that the failure by the police to contact HC's parents was a breach of the duty under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. It was further claimed that the police had fallen foul of Article 9(4) UNCRC, a provision that requires 'essential information' to be given to parents where the state has acted in a way that separates them from their child. The second element of the claim was that the Commissioner applied a blanket policy regarding the (non-) provision of appropriate adult support to 17 year-olds and that this constituted a fetter of discretion and hence was unlawful.
However the primary challenge -and that upon which the judgment of Lord Justice Moses was based -was against the Home Secretary for failing to exercise her power to amend Code C to extend the special protections to 17 year olds.
In light of the decision on the claim against the Home Secretary (see below), it was held by the Court that the claims against the Commissioner of Police did not warrant separate consideration and that the Commissioner was not to be blamed for following the letter of Code C; it was the Code itself, and the Home Secretary's failure to amend it, that was the principal object of concern. No relief was therefore granted against the Commissioner for the Police, in recognition, perhaps, that the purpose of the challenge was strategic: to secure the amendment of PACE.
THE LEGAL ISSUES
The central question in the case was the legality of treating 17 year olds as adults when arrested, questioned and detained in police custody, and specifically the exclusion from the provisions within PACE Code C. The Home Secretary has the power to amend the PACE Codes of Practice (with the approval of both House of Parliament) and in HC she accepted that she could exercise her discretion to alter the Code in order to bring 17 year olds within the definition of juveniles for the purpose of the child-specific protections, even if the equivalent statutory provisions did not so extend. However, the Secretary of State did not accept that she was legally obliged to make such amendments.
There were two principal, interlinking strands to the claimant's argument. 53 The first centred on establishing that children as a class ought to be treated differently from adults when in police detention: that the power imbalance between children and the police, and 58 For the High Court in HC, these authorities meant that the requirement for special treatment for children was beyond doubt.
The second aspect of the argument -and the crux of the case -was that the Home Secretary was wrong to define a child for these purposes as a person under 17 years old. The 53 These two strands were merged in the judgment. The claimant's arguments were supported by evidence presented to the court by the parents of two 17 year-old boys who had committed suicide after being arrested, and by the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Coram Children's Centre who both submitted interventions. 54 Above n 3 (un-adapted proceedings in the Crown court can breach Article 6 ECHR if the child's ability to participate effectively is restricted). 55 Above n 20 (consent was not required prior to the issuing of a final warning even though it is required for an adult caution Children's Commissioner, and the National Appropriate Adult Network. Undoubtedly, the evidence provided to the court in support of (1) giving children special protection in police detention, and (2) bringing 17 year olds within the definition of a child, was considerable.
In response to the claimant's arguments, and counter to most of the evidence presented to the Court, the Home Secretary put forward five reasons for not extending the child-specific PACE protections to 17 year olds. These reasons were mostly founded on two assertions: (i) that amendments to PACE were unnecessary because of the existence of other rights available more widely to suspected offenders and (ii) the special protections could, in most circumstances, be provided to a 17 year old on a discretionary basis in any event. For 59 Unless the law grants majority at an earlier age. The claimant's argued that the fact that English law confers certain responsibilities on the child at earlier ages does not change the fact that 18 is the age of majority and hence the protections of the UNCRC should apply to all up to the age of 18. This must be right or else it would negate the purpose of the UNCRC if a state could simply legislate on an ad hoc basis to remove the rights of the child in specific contexts by purportedly 'granting' majority. 60 where the rights of both child and parent under Article 8 are engaged than when a child is in custody on suspicion of committing a serious offence and needs help from someone with whom he is familiar and whom he trusts, in redressing the imbalance between the child and authority'. 74 Once accepted, it became impossible to justify the treatment of a 17 year old as an adult because doing so fails to demonstrate that the child's best interests have been treated as a primary consideration.
Given that HC was successful on Article 8 grounds, the court did not consider it necessary to decide on the Article 6 argument. Nonetheless, it was clear from Lord Justice
Moses' obiter dicta comments that compliance with Article 6 requires a youth justice system that provides all children with special protection during pre-charge questioning and detention. The sympathies of the court towards the applicant's claim were evident from the outset of the judgment when Lord Justice Moses noted the irony that HC was prohibited under the Civil Procedure Rules 81 from bringing the legal challenge without the assistance of his mother (or that of another adult) and yet was 'denied the unqualified right to her help when arrested.'
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The outcome was, therefore, not surprising and once the relevance of the UN Convention was established (through the vehicle of the ECHR), with its definition of a child in Article 1, it was almost impossible to argue that 17 year olds should be treated as adults. The decision and the reasoning provide robust support for the principle that children in the criminal justice system require additional support and that this should extend until 18, the age of majority.
One particularly interesting aspect of the case was the choice by the court to find for HC only on the basis of Article 8 ECHR and not also (or instead) on Article 6 ECHR grounds; some of the possible consequences of doing so are discussed here. However, it should be noted that throughout the reasoning the values of Article 6 infused the discussion of Article 8 (specifically relating to the best interests of children) and of course, there were strong obiter comments on Article 6 as well. What follows should not, therefore, be taken to suggest that the Court was not alive to the importance of the child's Article 6 rights; clearly these were of utmost concern.
Prioritising Children's rights regarding Articles 6 and 8 ECHR and the best interests of the child, could be explained by the centrality of Article 6 to the trial process and the ambiguity that sometimes emerges in judicial statements regarding its applicability to proceedings that occur pre-charge. 89 Further, being detained and questioned by the police marks the threshold of the criminal law: the transition for children from the private sphere to the public sphere of criminal justice. And at least one of the duties in HC -the parental notification duty -has little direct relevance to Article 6. Nonetheless, the overwhelming tone of the reasoning in HC was strongly focused on the child qua child, with great emphasis placed on the child-parent relationship. Although this may be a case where the court was choosing to focus on the parents' rights as well as the child, it may also be indicative of a wider shift towards a less punitive, more child-focused youth justice system: a shift that is also evident in (some) legislative and policy developments. 90 The criminal justice system is a long way from being compatible with the UNCRC but the influence of the Convention is surely being felt in the growing emphasis placed on the child qua child as a primary status in youth justice, countering the 'adultification' 91 of children that has been dominant since the late 1990s.
Article 8, Article 6 and Appropriate Adults
88 Article 5 protects the rights and responsibilities of parents towards their children and Article 9 provides that parents and child should not be separated except in limited, defined circumstances. 89 See below at n 93 and surrounding text. 90 See for example, the extension of looked after status to children on remand, a more flexible system of diversion and a huge drop in the rates of custodial sentences for the under 18s (see K. Hollingsworth, (2012) above n 46). This should not be overstated though and the proposed reforms to anti-social behaviour for example, alter little. Relying on Article 8 for the parental notification duty was undoubtedly necessary; it was the relationship between the parent and the child, and the more general restriction of the child's right to a private life, which was key to establishing the obligation. But the same is not true of the appropriate adult duty. At least one way to view the role of the appropriate adult is as a mechanism to protect the child's rights as suspect to help prevent wrongful conviction. To the extent that Article 6 includes the right to an appropriate adult, it too should be interpreted in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child so that it extends to all children.
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Using Article 6 as the primary mechanism to do this could, therefore, have achieved the same outcome.
That the case was not so decided may be indicative of the uncertain status of Article 6
in the pre-charge context. 93 It may also represent reluctance on the part of the Court to specify the exact content of Article 6 for children being questioned and detained by the Police. Although the judgment was replete with explanations of what was in the child's best interests when detained by the police, including parental notification and appropriate adult support to mitigate vulnerability, it was a procedural argument (that the best interests of children must demonstrably have been treated as a primary consideration) rather than the substance (what is in the best interest of children) that formed the basis of the reasoning.
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The Court thus used the concept of best interests primarily as a marker for differential treatment of children and adults in the criminal justice system rather than as the basis for specific protections.
The Court's reliance on Article 8 and the best interests requirement, rather than Article 6, means that future compatibility with the decision requires only that children up to 92 In particular, Articles 3, 12 and 40. See for example, the concurring opinion of Mr N Bratza in V v United Kingdom above n 3 at p 37. 93 See above, n 20 at para [11] and the discussion in HC at para [91] . Nb Lord Bingham's comments on the doubtful application of Article 6 pre-charge were obiter only. 94 See for example, para [97] .
the age of 18 be treated differently from adults; this would be sufficient to demonstrate that their best interests have been accounted for. The way is therefore open for the Government to differentiate between the support that older and younger children receive, provided even older children are treated differently from adults. 95 This means that the rights currently afforded to older children to mitigate their lack of power, capacity and increased vulnerability in the criminal processes, could be diminished and, provided there was still a difference with adults, it would not necessarily fall foul -strictly speaking -with the letter (if not the spirit) of this judgment. Had the Court focused its reasoning on the demands of Article 6 then the content of the rights would have to be more clearly articulated and any attempt -in secondary or primary legislation -to diminish those rights would risk being struck down or being the subject of a declaration of compatibility -at least whilst the Human Rights Act remains on the statute books.
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Parents as Appropriate Adults
One of the few shortcomings with the decision was the presumption made by the Court that parents are best placed to fulfil the role of appropriate adult. 97 Whether the decision to use Article 8 shaped the Court's description of the role of appropriate adult, or whether the Court's view of the role of the appropriate adult determined the focus on Article 8 is unclear.
Regardless, some caution should be exercised before basing the requirement for an appropriate adult on the presumption that it is parents who should fulfil the role.
In Code C of PACE, three different categories of persons are authorised to act as an appropriate adult for juveniles: (a) the parent or guardian of the suspected child, (b The role is thus seen to inconsistently contain 'elements of due process, crime control, welfare and crime prevention'. 113 Successive governments have justified the role of appropriate adults as a means to secure better evidence and to provide the support to children to 'explain, face up to and take responsibility for their behaviour'. 114 If this is a legitimate role for the appropriate adult, then parents may well be in the best position to fulfil it, especially given the wider parental 'responsibilisation' duties that have become especially prominent in the youth justice context since 1998. 115 There is some evidence that Lord Justice Moses at least partially supports this version of the role of appropriate adult. 116 However, as evident elsewhere in judgment -and supported from a principled and policy perspective 117 -the appropriate adult should protect welfare-based interests, parents may be best placed to fulfil the role. 118 However, if the appropriate adult's role is to help protect the child's legal rights qua suspect and to shield him from the coercive force of the state then parents may be far less suitable. 119 There are at least three reasons for this. First, empirical research suggests that parents are unlikely to intervene in police interviews and instead often take a passive role. 120 There is a danger that such passivity fails adequately to protect the child against (potentially) aggressive, confusing or coercive police questioning. However, this may be a problem common to all appropriate adults, including those independently appointed by the local authority. 121 The difference, however, is that appointed appropriate adults can be better trained to more assertively protect children's rights, whereas parents cannot. Secondly, the young person may view his parent as an authority figure, with whom he is unable to confide or seek reassurance; and not the supportive figure that Lord Justice Moses envisages. In R v Blake it was held that the appropriate adult cannot be a person with whom the young person has no empathy, 122 and the appropriate adult must be able to develop a rapport with the young person, but such a rapport does not necessarily exist between a child and his parent. Furthermore, parents have conflicting roles when in the police station which may serve to diminish their ability to protect the interests of the child. Evans' research provides examples of parents 'siding' with the police 123 and being less than supportive of their child, 124 due to the pre-existing relationship with the child and their own emotional reaction to the child's suspected involvement in offending behaviour.
There are also potential negative consequences for parents who do fulfil the role of appropriate adult in a way that better protects the child's legal rights. For example, where the parent intervenes and insists on legal representation for the child, or advises the child to remain silent until a legal advisor is present, research has suggested that the police may perceive the parent as 'uncooperative' and not acting 'responsibly' towards the child.
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Where this is noted on the police file, it could influence later contact between the YOT and the family. This possible conflict has been heightened by the increased emphasis on parental responsibility since 1998, and it is not inconceivable that a YOT officer could use information relating to the parent's demeanour and 'cooperation' at the police station to inform the recommendation (or otherwise) of a parenting order should the child be charged and appear before a court. Parents are thus placed in a difficult position and are expected to act 'responsibly' towards their child (i.e. go along with the police) whilst also providing a pivotal role in protecting the child's rights at the police station. 126 It is for these reasons that a number of commentators have argued that volunteers are to be preferred over both parents.
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Therefore, in contrast to the prevailing view in HC, local authority appointments or volunteers rather than parents may be better placed to act as appropriate adults because they are more likely to have received specific training, they will be independent of the police, they 125 For example, Lee found that parents who actively fulfilled the appropriate adult role and who were prepared to interrupt the police were recorded as 'uncooperative' on the police file: M Lee, ' can provide the child with information about other services, and research shows they are more likely to take a child-centred approach (based either on due process or welfare), rather than a crime control approach. 128 The allocation of a volunteer or local authority appointed appropriate adult need not exclude the presence of parents during the processes: 129 Parry notes that parents retain a 'moral obligation' to be present during questioning even if they do not act as an appropriate adult. 130 Indeed, as noted above, parents are better placed in many instances to protect the needs of the child, particularly given the poor information flow between YOTs and appropriate adults which mean that non-parent appropriate adults can be ill-prepared to fulfil any welfare function that may be expected of them. 131 Having a parent and an appropriate adult present, as suggested by the last Government in 2008, 132 may be the best way to secure the child's welfare and his criminal justice rights.
The above is not, therefore, meant to undermine the importance of the parent-child relationship or the desirability of parents being present when children are detained and questioned by the police, where this is in the child's best interests.
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But given the limitations that face parents in fulfilling some aspects of the appropriate adult role, then the two functions (protecting the child's best interests and protecting her rights to a fair trial) and the ECHR rights upon which they are based (Articles 8 and 6 respectively) should be decoupled. That is, a better outcome in HC would have been for the court to clearly articulate that the proper basis for appropriate adult support is Article 6 not Article 8. 128 Compared to parents, for example (Pierpoint (2006) ibid). However, as Pierpoint notes, even though volunteers may attempt to take a welfare approach, they are still operating within an overall crime control and managerialist framework. 129 See also Rule 15.2 of the Beijing Rules which provides that: 'The parents or the guardian shall be entitled to participate in the proceedings and may be required by the competent authority to tend them in the interest of the juvenile (subject to exclusion where necessary in the interests of the juvenile)'. 130 
Concluding comments
The decision in HC has been widely welcomed and has helped to fill a lacuna in the law in relation to the protection of 17 year olds in the criminal justice system. As noted above, the Government have revised Code C in order to reflect the outcome in HC. However, the revisions have been subject to considerable criticism from children's rights organisations for making only the minimum changes necessary to secure compliance with the decision. The
Government has neither committed to amending the underpinning primary legislation nor have they extended the local authority accommodation duty to 17 year olds. The failure to do so is unfortunate. 134 Though this duty is rarely met even to those children to whom it is currently owed: see the findings of the Joint Inspection (above n 8 at p 9) where in two-thirds of the cases they reviewed where a child was charged and denied bail, no local authority accommodation was requested; and also the FOI request made by the Howard League: http://d19ylpo4aovc7m.cloudfront.net/fileadmin/howard_league/user/pdf/Publications/Overnight_detention_of_ children_in__police_cells_2011.pdf
